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THE KEEPER OF THE FLAME: GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
Mary E. Hiscock*
Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides
that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement."' "Good faith" is
defined in section 1-201 as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned.",2 Section 2-103 further defines good faith for
a merchant in the context of transactions in goods as "honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade."3 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that
"[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement. '
These formulations of American law are mirrored in one of the
central principles of the new UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles).5 The principle on
good faith and fair dealing states that: "(1) Each party must act in
accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international trade
[and] (2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty."
The resemblance is not coincidental. This discussion considers
the role of the concept of good faith and fair dealing in nondomestic,
nonconsumer transactions in common-law systems. Many eminent
* LL.B. (Honours) (Melbourne); J.D.(Chicago); Professor of Law, Bond University,
Gold Coast, Australia; Chair, International Law Section, Law Council of Australia.
1. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
2. It. § 1-201(19).
3. Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
5. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 1994, art. 1.7, 34
I.L.M. 1067, 1069 (1995). A working group of members of UNIDROIT, the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, developed the UNIDROIT Principles between
1980 and 1994. Michael Joachim Bonell of the University of Rome coordinated the
project. The working group consisted of eminent lawyers from all parts of the world,
representing all major families of law.
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legal scholars have discussed the general topic of good faith.6 As
part of the discussion of common-law systems, I would like to empha-
size the contribution to the debate from Australian law and lawyers.7
The inclusion of a good faith duty as a fundamental and
mandatory principle of contract law in international commercial
transactions indicates how far commerce has traveled along a rocky
road. The common-law world has been split over the existence and
extent of a discrete principle in these terms for over a century.' I
return to the battlefield only because I believe that the balance has
tipped within the last decade such that there is a consensus supporting
,the UNIDROIT statement, in substance if not in form. I do so in a
Symposium on the UCC because, given the strength of the opposition
to the concept of good faith as a source of obligations in contract, it
is unlikely that the principle would have achieved its present level of
acceptance had it not found a safe harbor within the UCC after its
journey from European law. From there it can now emerge in the
battle amongst the common-law lawyers in the hope that, at least, a
dusty truce can be achieved.
6. A brief bibliography must include 2 J.V. STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM
BORGERLICHEN GEFEKBUCHMrr GINFUHRUNGSGEFEK UND REBENGEFEKN (11th ed.
1957); Michael G. Bridge, Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law Need a Doctrine of Good
Faith?, 9 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 385 (1984); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the
Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1980); M.P.
Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE LJ. 757 (1969); E. Allan Farnsworth,
Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666 (1963); Paul Finn, Commerce, the Common Law and
Morality, 17 MELB. U. L. REV. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Finn, Commerce]; Clayton P.
Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DuKE L.J. 619; Friedrich
Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REV. 401 (1964); H.K. Lucke, Good Faith
and Contractual Performance, in ESSAYS ON CoNTRACr 155 (P.D. Finn ed., 1987); Raphael
Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS. 16 (1956); Robert S.
Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); and Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract
Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
7. See ANTHONYDUGGANETAL., CONTRACTUALNON-DISCLOSURE 122-47(1994);
Ellinghaus, supra note 6; Finn, Commerce, supra note 6; Lucke, supra note 6.
8. In Allen v. Flood Wills J stated that "any right given by contract may be exercised
as against the giver by the person to whom it is granted, no matter how wicked, cruel, or
mean the motive may be which determines the enforcement of the right." Allen v. Flood,
1898 App. Cas. 1, 46 (P.C. 1897) (appeal taken from Eng.). Compare the discussion by
the New York Court of Appeals in Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624
(N.Y. 1914) about the "implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing" in contract
performance.
GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Significant in the UNIDROIT principles is the acceptance of
good faith in commercial contracts-contracts between mer-
chants-from different systems. Good faith is professed as a shared
value in international trade. It is not merely manifested in solutions
to particular contract problems, such as the right to terminate,9 but
it is seen as an overarching source of obligations. That role has been
regarded as controversial in the past. Critics have regarded good faith
in this sense as antithetical to the value of certainty in the commercial
law developed in common-law systems,10 as an unarticulated major
premise behind many specific rules of the law," or, at best, accepted
it as a synonym for reasonableness.
12
In the same way that the good faith duty is separate from all
those particular rules that exemplify it, so also is it separate from the
concept of unconscionability and the host of equitable doctrines that
have permeated contract law. Unconscionability, whether mea-
sured by a process or by a result which is shocking and unacceptable
to the law, demonstrates management of contract by crisis. The good
faith duty is part of the norms of contract management. As such, it
is part of the common-law component of common-law systems.
A shared European-based heritage of the ethical concerns
underlies good faith and fair dealing. In Cicero's dialogue, De Officiis
(On the Nature of Duties), he discussed duties of disclosure in the
context of a grain merchant who was carrying a cargo of grain from
9. This is neatly summarized by Priestley JA in Renard Constrs. (ME) v. Minister for
Pub. Works, 26 N.S.W.L.R. 234, 269 (1992) as follows: "[T]he same reaction by a court
to what is felt to be unfair use of a contractual right can manifest itself in two apparently
quite different forms: one by saying the right [to terminate] does not exist in the particular
circumstances, the other by saying it is wrong to use it."
10. Professor Bridge speaks of good faith as "a concept which means different things
to different people in different moods at different times and in different places." Bridge,
supra note 6, at 407.
11. See ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON AMENDMENT OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACT 166 (1987), which recommended the adoption of § 205 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts after stating- "[W]hile good faith is not yet an openly recognized
contract law doctrine... a great many well-established concepts in contract law reflect a
concern for good faith, fair dealing and the protection of reasonable expectations, creating
a legal behavioural baseline."
12. See Schenker & Co. v. Maplas Equip., 1990 V.R. 834, 840-41 (1989) (Austl.). But
cf White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor, 1962 App. Cas. 413, 430 (P.C. 1961)
(appeal taken from Scot.) (per statement by Lord Reid in the House of Lords; "[I]t never
has been... the law that a person is only entitled to enforce his contractual rights [only]
in a reasonable way").
13. These doctrines include the expansion of the role of the fiduciary to play a greater
role in commerce.
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Alexandria to Rhodes.'4 Rhodes was experiencing famine."5 The
merchant had a fast ship and overtook a number of other merchants
also carrying grain to Rhodes.16 He preceded them to their destina-
tion.'7 Should he have disclosed their imminent arrival? Cicero's
view was clear: He described a merchant who would not disclose in
these circumstances as the reverse of "open, straightforward, well
bred, just or good; but rather a twister, mysterious, cunning, tricky, ill-
intentioned, crafty, roguish and sly."'" The contrary view he put in
the mouth of Diogenes: "Where it is up to the buyer to judge, how
can there be deceit on the part of the seller?"' 9
Significantly, Cicero was not only putting forward an ethical view
about the merchant's conduct, but one which he believed was
reflected in Roman law.2' This debate has endured through the
ages. It was the nineteenth century triumph of Diogenes that turned
the path of the common law away from its earlier ethical and
commercial roots. Blackburn 21, one of the strongest commercial
judges on the late 19th century English bench, stated in Smith v.
Hughes2' that "whatever may be the case in a court of morals, there
is no legal obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser that he
is under a mistake, not induced by the act of the vendor."'  Or in
a literary setting:
Six days shalt thou swindle and lie!
On the seventh - tho' it soundeth odd -
In the odour of sanctity
Thou shalt offer the Lord, thy God,
A threepenny bit, a doze, a start, and an unctuous smile,
14. CICERO, ON DUTIES 118-19 (M.T. Griffin & E.M. Atkins eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991).
15. Id at 118.
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id at 121. This example is quoted by DUGGAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1-2.
19. CICERO, supra note 14, at 120.
20. This view is also supported by F.H. Lawson. See F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON
LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 125 (1955). In the case of a sale, the tribunal had
the burden of deciding what the defendant ought in good faith to have done, in
other words what kind of performance the contract called for. This meant that,
in contrast to the stipulation, where all the terms have to be expressed, the
parties would be bound not only by the terms they had actually agreed to, but
by all the terms that were naturally implied in their agreement.
Id.
21. 6 L.R.-Q.B. 597 (1871).
22. Id
GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
And a hurried prayer to prosper another six days of guile.'
The convergence of commercial morality and common law most
clearly appears in the earlier legacy of Lord Mansfield, common to
both American and Anglo-Australian law. In Carter v. Boehm24
Lord Mansfield said that good faith was a principle "applicable to all
contracts and dealings."'  He maintained this position, together with
an emphasis on the values of certainty. In Vallejo v. Wheeler26 he
stated his policy as follows: "In all mercantile transactions the great
object should be certainty: and therefore, it is of more consequence
that a rule should be certain, than whether the rule is established one
way or the other. Because speculators in trade then know what
ground to go upon. '
This mature and informed commercial judgment illuminated the
law of the United States only for a time. Then the light dimmed, or,
as Professor Farnsworth described it, the general principle of good
faith performance was in a poor and neglected state except in New
York and California. 8  Hence decisions such as Wigand v.
Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co.29 emanated from the New York
Court of Appeals, which stated that "[e]very contract implies good
faith and fair dealing between the parties to it."30 This decision
preceded and led to the statement of the general principle of good
faith as a single unitary duty in the 1950 draft of the UCC. The terms
used were similar to the language of section 1-203, but included an
additional requirement of observance of the reasonable commercial
standards of any trade or business in which the relevant person is
engaged, as well as honesty in fact.3' However, at the insistence of
the American Bar Association Section on Corporation, Banking and
Business Law, the single statement was recast as a general statement,
and a merchant's definition was inserted." The rationale for this
23. GEORGE ESSEX EVANS, ODE TO THE PHILISTINES (n.d.).
24. 97 Eng. Rep. 1162 (K.B. 1766).
25. 1d. at 1164.
26. 98 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1774).
27. Id. at 1017.
28. Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 671.
29. 118 N.E. 618 (N.Y. 1918). To the same effect, see Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul
Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933) and Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press
Mfg., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 128 P.2d 665 (1942).
30. Wigand, 118 N.E. at 619.
31. Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 673.
32. I&
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appears to have been a belief that the drafting change meant no
substantive change in the effect of section 1-201."3
This development leads to the second limb of the controversy
over the good faith duty. Even assuming such a duty exists, what is
its content and purpose? Farnsworth answers this question:
[T]he chief utility of the concept of good faith performance
has always been as a rationale in a process which is not
intrusted to the trier of the facts-that of implying contract
terms. It was so even under Roman law; it was so under the
pre-[Uniform Commercial] Code case law in this country;
and it remains so under the Code. Good faith performance
has always required the cooperation of one party where it
was necessary in order that the other might secure the
expected benefits of the contract. And the standard for
determining what cooperation was required has always been
an objective standard, based on the decency, fairness or
reasonableness of the community and not on the individual's
own beliefs as to what might be decent, fair or reasonable.
Both common sense and tradition dictate an objective
standard for good faith performance.34
Two recent sets of cases portray the range of views in the English and
Australian jurisdictions on the meaning of a good faith obligation in
performance. They provide an interesting contrast and should be a
sufficient platform on which to mount a consensus supporting the
UNIDROIT formulation of good faith duties as an extension of
domestic systems into international trade. The assumption must be
made in international trade that, apart from the Vienna Convention
on the International Sale of Goods,35 national law will ultimately
determine the rights of the parties, although this may be less true than
it once was.36
33. Id
34. Id at 672.
35. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668 (1987). Even the Vienna Convention itself, which is adopted by
national systems, finds a small place for good faith in Article 7, stating "[i]n the
interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in
international trade." Id. art. 7, at 673.
36. See Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Ins. Co., [1984] 1 App. Cas. 50 (1983)
(appeal taken from Eng.); Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft m.b.H. v. R'As
al-Khaimah Nat'l Oil Co., [1987] 3 W.L.R. 1023 (C.A.).
GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Service Station Ass'n v. Berg Bennett & Associates7 was a
federal court decision issued by Gummow J, now a Justice of the
High Court of Australia. The appellant and the respondent had a
publishing agreement for a trade journal for service station propri-
etors.38 In the course of performance, the publisher assumed greater
contractual responsibilities, eventually sharing the risk and the profits,
as well as providing technical publishing services.39 The respondent
informed the defendant that it would cease publication of the journal
after four weeks and then publish a new trade journal for the
industry, to be distributed to a similar readership list.4 The appel-
lant sought orders for injunctive and declaratory relie. 4' The court
held that there was no binding Australian authority which mandated
that there be implied into every contract as a matter of law a term
that each party to a contract will act in good faith and with fair
dealing in its performance and enforcement.42
Gummow J examined the Australian position in terms of section
205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.43 He considered the
statement of Judge Breitel, then recently retired as Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, offered as expert witness testimony and
accepted by the court in United States Surgical Corp. v. Hospital
Products International,' and approved by Dawson J in the High
Court on appeal from that decision.4' Ohio law governed the
transaction, a distributorship agreement.
Judge Breitel swore in his affidavit that the good faith obligation
"extends only to the performance of the express terms of an
agreement"; that it "may not be used as a springboard for other
implied terms"; and that it "simply means that neither party to an
agreement may do anything to impede performance of the agreement
or to injure the right of the other party to receive the proposed
benefit."
46
37. 45 F.C.R. 84 (N.S.W. Dist. Reg. 1993).
38. Id. at 86.
39. Id.
40. I at 87.
41. Id.
42. Id at 91-92.
43. Id. at 92.
44. 2 N.S.W.L.R. 766, 799-801 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 156 C.L.R. 41 (1984)
(Austi.).
45. Hospital Prods. Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp., 156 C.L.R. 41, 137-38 (1984)
(Austl.).
46. United States Surgical Corp., [1982] 2 N.S.W.L.R. at 800.
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Gummow J further relied on Secured Income Real Estate (Austra-
lia) Ltd. v. St. Martins Investments Proprietary Ltd..' a deci-sion of
the High Court of Australia applying well-established Australian and
English authority.' In that case, Mason J summarized existing law,
stating that parties to a contract are under "an implied obligation...
to do all that [is] reasonably necessary to secure performance of the
contract.... [and] 'to enable the other party to have the benefit of
the contract."' 4 9
In particular, Gummow J found the concluding words of Mason
J to be consistent with the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals in Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co.50 and, by
inference, the whole stream of United States authority, when he said:
It is easy to imply a duty to co-operate in the doing of
acts which are necessary to the performance by the parties
or by one of the parties of fundamental obligations under
the contract. It is not quite so easy to make the implication
when the acts in question are necessary to entitle the other
contracting party to a benefit under the contract but are not
essential to the performance of that party's obligations and
are not fundamental to the contract. Then the question
arises whether the contract imposes a duty to co-operate on
the first party or whether it leaves him at liberty to decide
for himself whether the acts shall be done, even if the
consequence-of his decision is to disentitle the other party to
a benefit. In such a case, the correct interpretation of the
contract depends, as it seems to me, not so much on the
application of the general rule of construction as on the
intention of the parties as manifested by the contract
itself
51
Gummow J then makes three further points of importance, two
of substance and one of structure. The first substantive point is that
the law on implied terms required for the "business efficacy" of a
47. 144 C.L.R. 596 (1979) (Austl.).
48. Service Station, 45 F.C.R. at 89.
49. Secured Income Real Estate, 144 C.L.R. at 607 (applying the rationale of Lord
Blackburn in Mackay v. Dick, 6 App. Cas. 251, 263 (1881) (appeal taken from Scot.) and
quoting Griffith CJ in Butt v. M'Donald, 7 Q.LJ. & R. 68, 71 (1896) (Austl.)).
50. 118 N.E. 618 (N.Y. 1918).
51. Secured Income Real Estate, 144 C.L.R. at 607-08.
April 1996] GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
contract, an area which has painfully evolved in Australian law,52 is
otiose if the same ground could be covered by an implied "good
faith" term.53
The second substantive point is that the concept of good faith is
imprecise, whereas "bad faith" is not. It is easier to identify examples
of bad behavior than to postulate a standard of good faith behavior
in positive terms. Canadian authority is cited in support of this point
as follows:
In most cases, bad faith can be said to occur when one party,
without reasonable justification, acts in relation to the
contracts in a manner where the result would be to substan-
tially nullify the bargained objective or benefit contracted for
by the other, or to cause significant harm to the other,
contrary to the original purpose and expectation of the
parties.54
This formulation is also in line with established Australian
authority.55  Interestingly, this result aligns with the Japanese
understanding of a good faith performance obligation, an inheritance
from its civil law antecedents, but more directly from the Allied
occupation after World War II and the process of democratization of
Japanese law. 6
The structural point is that Anglo-Australian law has developed
differently from American law on implied terms, with greater
emphasis on specifics rather than the identification of a principle
expressed in wide terms.5 Equity has played a role in determining
the quality of performance, but it "requires a leap of faith to translate
52. See Codelfa Constr. v. State Rail Auth., 149 C.L.R. 337 (1982) (Austl.); Secured
Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd. v. St. Martins Invs., 144 C.L.R. 596 (1979) (Austl.);
B.P. Refinery (Westernport) v. Shire of Hastings, 52 A.L.R. 20 (P.C. 1977) (Austl.).
53. There are cases where good faith and reasonableness are implied in order to give
"business efficacy" to a contract and to save it from failure for uncertainty. These cases
include Meehan v. Jones, 149 C.L.R. 571 (1982) (Austl.) (implying good faith subject to
finance clause in a real estate sale contract) and Booker Indus. v. Wilson Parking (Qld),
149 C.L.R. 600 (1982) (Austl.) (implying good faith where rent to be fixed by a third
party).
54. Gateway Realty Ltd. v. Arton Holdings Ltd., 106 N.S.R.2d 180, 197 (1991).
55. See case cited supra note 46 and accompanying text.
56. The Japanese Civil Code, states that "[t]he exercise of rights and performance of
duties must be done faithfully and in accordance with the principles of trust." MINPo book
I, art. 1; see Veronica L. Taylor, The 'New' Japanese ContracL Law and Practice in the
1990s, in ATrORNEY-GENERAL's DEP'T & LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, TWENTIETH
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW CONFERENCE 37, 62-69 (1993).
57. Service Station Ass'n, 45 F.C.R. at 96.
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these well-established doctrines and remedies into a new term as to
the quality of contractual performance, implied by law."58
The twin of this decision is Renard Constructions (ME) v.
Minister for Public Works. 9 This case concerned the exercise of
powers of termination in a construction contract, including giving
notice to show cause why the powers should not be exercised: The
court held that such contractual powers were to be exercised
reasonably and honestly.6' The importance of the decision is the link
drawn by Priestley JA between reasonableness as required by the
court and good faith. He said:
The kind of reasonableness I have been discussing seems to
me to have much in common with the notions of good faith
which are regarded in many of the civil law systems of
Europe and in all States in the United States as necessarily
implied in many kinds of contract. Although this implication
has not yet been accepted to the same extent in Australia as
part of judge-made Australian contract law, there are many
indications that the time may be fast approaching when the
idea, long recognised as implicit in many of the orthodox
techniques of solving contractual disputes, will gain explicit
recognition in the same way as it has in Europe and in the
United States.62
These cases together indicate that the law in Australia has
reached a state of fluidity where the substance of the law under the
UCC and Australian law may be the same, but a range of judicial
attitudes exists concerning the acceptance of a discrete good faith
contract performance obligation. The attitude of the recently
appointed Chief Justice of the High Court is therefore especially
important. Considering the question extrajudicially in 1989, when
invited to propound a precise theory of morality for application to
commercial law-an invitation he declined-he quoted the prayer of
St. Augustine "in resisting conversion from a profligate life: 'Not yet,
0 Lord, not yet!"' 63
58. Id at 97.
59. 26 N.S.W.L.R. 234 (1992).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 263.
62. Id. at 263-64.
63. Honourable Sir Gerard Brennan, Commercial Law and Morality, 17 MELB. U. L.
REV. 100, 100 (1989).
GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The other set of cases is drawn from England and Australia and
relates to a good faith obligation in the negotiation of contract terms.
In England, the House of Lords decided that no such obligation
existed.' However, the Court of Appeal in New South Wales stated
in dicta that it did not share the English opinion that no promise to
negotiate in good faith would ever be recognized, although in the
instant case of negotiation of a joint venture contract, the promise was
too vague to be enforceable.' This difference may be more appar-
ent than real and may rest more in differences of judicial attitudes
than in the law itself.
Article 1.106 of the Principles of European Contract Law66
reflects the result of the judicial discussions in the 1980s and the 1990s
in the common-law jurisdictions of England and Australia.
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
(1) In exercising his rights and performing his duties
each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing.
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty.67
A comment and notes accompany these Principles. The comment
to article 1.106 points out that:
What is good faith will, however, to some extent depend
upon what was agreed upon by the parties in their contract.
However, a party should not have a right to take advan-
tage of a term in the contract or of one of these Principles
in a way that, given the circumstances, would be unaccept-
able according to the standards of good faith and fair
dealing.'
The note further illustrates that, although the principle for good
faith and fair dealing is evident in contractual behaviour in all
European Community countries, there is a considerable difference as
to its extent and power. The spectrum runs from German law, where
64. See Walford v. Miles, 1 All E.R. 453 (1992) (appeal taken from Eng.).
65. See Coal Cliff Collieries v. Sijehama Ltd., 24 N.S.W.L.R. 1, 26-27 (1991).
66. See COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACr LAW art. 1.106, at 53 (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 1995). This reflection
was the result of the deliberations of a group of European scholars, the Commission on
European Contract Law, under the chairmanship of Professor Ole Lando.
67. Id
68. Id. art. 1.106 cmt. H.
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section 242 of the German Civil Code has revolutionized the law,
69
to England where the principle is specifically not recognized, although
in many cases application of particular rules would achieve the same
result. This is a classic scenario for a common law system to move,
when it is ready, to the induction of a fundamental principle." The
existence of statements of principle, such as those in UNIDROIT and
the European Principles, as well as those of the UCC, is a significant
reinforcement. Similarly, the recognition of the place of guidelines in
international transactions, as occurs in the Inter-American Convention
on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, is also part of this
incremental process.71 When the last steps are taken, as they will
soon be in Australia, the extensive body of case law and of writing
that has accumulated around the UCC will inform the law, as it has
so many times before.
69. For a brief review of this point see NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE
AND COMMERCIAL LAW: AN INTRODUCION 135-46 (Tony Weir trans., 1982).
70. As happened most notably in Anglo-Australian law in the case of Donoghue v.
Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562 (appeal taken from Scot.), when a general duty of care in
negligence was propounded resting on a concept of proximity. It is interesting to note that
the idea of a duty to a neighbour is also put forward as the basis of a good faith obligation
across the sphere of private law. See P.D. Finn, Equity and Contract, in ESSAYS ON
CONTRACr 104 (P.D. Finn ed., 1987); Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial
Good Faith. Good-Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 381
(1978); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1717 (1976).
71. The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts
was approved in March of 1994 and is binding on 19 states in North and South America.
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, Mar. 17,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 732. Article 10 of that Convention provides, "[i]n addition to the
provisions in the foregoing articles, the guidelines, customs, and principles of international
commercial law as well as commercial usage and practices generally accepted shall apply
in order to discharge the requirements of justice and equity in the particular case." Id. art.
10, at 735.
